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Abstract
Using public goods models of military alliances, this paper presents a normative
analysis of the effects of cooperative security institutions, such as the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe and the ASEAN Regional Forum, on defense
spending of countries and global security. The analysis reveals that the effects of these
measures on national defense spending are not deterministic. Depending on the network
of military alliances, the membership of cooperative security organizations, and national
budgets of countries, cooperative security measures are either effective or ineffective.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Although the world of sovereign states is a self-help system in which individual states
are ultimately forced to rely on their own powers, states have attempted to alleviate this
situation by embarking on collective efforts between them. Among other efforts,
collective defense, which is conventionally called alliance, is a form of collaboration
that has played a central role to the present day. Although alliances remained loose
bonds of countries until the early 20th century, states’ efforts to formalize collective
defense were strengthened during the Cold War. In fact, multilateral collective defense
organizations, such as NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization, as well as bilateral
alliances, such as those between the United States and Asian countries, were
institutionalized to an unprecedented level during this period. Despite the disappearance
of some collective defense arrangements after the end of the Cold War, most of them
have adjusted their function to the new environment, and they continue to assume a vital
role in contemporary world politics.1
Meanwhile, states launched another type of collective effort, called cooperative
security, in the late 20th century. In order to promote dialogue between the West and the
East, which had faced off by organizing their own collective defense groups, the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was created in the 1970s.
Like collective defense arrangements, cooperative security institutions also survived the
end of the Cold War. The CSCE developed into the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the 1990s, and it continues to play a role in
stabilizing the precarious relationship between the Western and the former socialist
countries. Cooperative security has expanded geographically as well. In Asia,
cooperative security mechanisms were embodied in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
1 Following the changes in the international security environment after the end of the
Cold War, NATO’s role has been expanded to include a wide range of so-called
non-Article 5 operations, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention (NATO
2011). Some researchers have focused on this new development and illuminated
significant changes in NATO’s functions in the post-Cold War period (see Adler 2008;
Hoffman 2009). Even so, the conventional role of a military alliance remains its primary
objective. For Russia, NATO’s eastward expansion in the post-Cold War period is an
indication that NATO’s purpose has been essentially unchanged. Meanwhile, it is also
said that Russia and China have attempted to strengthen the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO) as a collective defense organization able to compete with the
growing presence of the Western countries in Central and East Asia (e.g., Ambrosio
2008; Hanova 2009; see also Aris 2011: 67). Thus, the rivalry pitting the Western
countries against Russia and China continues to evolve through the old and new
collective defense arrangements.
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in the early 1990s. The ARF’s function has been increasingly strengthened since its
establishment, and it is currently seen as the first Asian security forum that helps foster
mutual confidence between China and Russia on the one hand, and liberal democratic
countries such as Japan, South Korea, and the United States on the other.2
As of 2000, version 3.03 of the Correlates of War (COW) formal alliance dataset
identifies 32 military alliances, and 122 participants in these alliances, around the world
(Gibler 2009; Gibler and Sarkees 2004). Meanwhile, the current OSCE consists of 56
countries, and the member states are drawn from all across North America and Europe,
while the ARF has 26 participants, mostly located in the Asia-Pacific region and the
European Union. Given this fact, the contemporary international security system is
appropriately described as a network of countries that is sustained by the combination of
collaborative as well as individual defense activities of countries.
A notable fact regarding this system is that in contrast to private and collective
defense, cooperative security has scarcely been addressed by scholars. The one
exception is constructivists in international relations studies. Since key elements of
cooperative security practices are designed to build mutual confidence between enemies,
constructivists, who emphasize intersubjective understandings, have been more
interested in these practices than others have been. In particular, ASEAN scholars have
played a dominant role in the study of cooperative security. These scholars find that the
so-called ASEAN way could be extended to the broader East Asian area and argue that
this diplomatic and security approach would become an effective means of stabilizing
the entire region. After witnessing the intensified rivalry between major countries in the
region, such as China and Japan, they are more cautious about the ARF’s prospects in
recent years (e.g., Morada 2010). However, their overall expectations remain unchanged,
and they regard the ARF as constituting a significant cooperative security institution in
East Asia (e.g., Katsumata 2009; Acharya 2009: Chap. 6).
2 The concept of common security is also used to describe the function of the CSCE.
This notion was developed during the Cold War and presupposes unambiguous hostility
between military blocs. On the other hand, the concept of cooperative security began to
prevail in the post-Cold War period, following the publication of Carter et al. (1993).
Cooperative security usually presupposes more potential rivalry than common security
does. In addition, cooperative security often indicates more flexible and less
institutionalized collaboration, as observed in Asia. Despite these differences, however,
the two concepts describe substantively the same type of security collaboration, in that
the core function fulfilled by both mechanisms is to promote peace between adversaries,
either explicit or potential, by developing mutual confidence that encompasses these
adversaries (see also Emmers 2004: 68). Since this paper investigates the role of this
core function, in the rest of this paper I will use only the term “cooperative security.”
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Despite the constructivists’ evaluation, however, the nascent and nonviolent nature
of cooperative security arrangements leads a number of international security scholars
to consider that these measures are merely “well-meaning” and ineffective. For example,
Jones and Smith (2007), who are skeptical about constructivist approaches, argue that
constructivists overestimate the ASEAN way’s potency and assert that the extension of
the ASEAN way into wider areas is unpromising. Similarly, although some researchers,
such as Galbreath (2007), rate the effectiveness of the OSCE highly, many scholars
emphasize the enmity between the Western and the former Soviet countries in the first
decade of the 21st century and are usually skeptical about the prospects of the OSCE in
Eurasia (e.g., Gheciu 2008; Boonstra 2011).
I also agree with the view that cooperative security arrangements are still in a
primitive stage and that the ability of these arrangements to promote peace remains
limited. Taking these limitations as a given, this paper attempts to estimate the policy
effects of cooperative security measures when these measures are strengthened or
weakened by countries, using a model of national resource allocation between different
types of defense policy. In other words, this paper provides a normative, rather than
positive, analysis of defense policy choice in the sense used by mathematical economics.
If the analysis reveals that the increased practices of cooperative security curtail the
overall defense expenditure in the world, then this paper implies that cooperative
security should be encouraged. On the other hand, if these practices function inversely,
then these measures should be discouraged. Thus, instead of presenting an assessment
of the current cooperative security institutions, this paper aims at providing policy
suggestions for the future implementation of cooperative security policy.
In this paper, I develop a model in which states seek to enhance their security by
allocating their resources to three types of defense activities: private defense, collective
defense (alliance), and cooperative security. The next section reviews the literature
relating to this model. The third section derives general propositions by presenting a
two-group model in which states participating in one of two adversarial collective
defense groups attempt to embark on cooperative security activities across the groups.
The fourth section concludes.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
As described above, countries in the contemporary international security system allocate
their resources not only to private but also to collaborative defense efforts. This type of
collective action between countries has been seen as the provision of international
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public goods by states. International collective action in the area of defense policy was
first addressed by Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). Although Olson and Zeckhauser’s
(1966) seminal model focused on resource allocation problems between defense and
non-defense goods, Sandler (1977) and Murdoch and Sandler (1982) expand the OZ
model to differentiate private and public aspects of defense goods. The model in this
paper is further extended to divide the public part of defense goods into collective
defense and cooperative security.3
The literature on the variants of the OZ model before the mid-1990s has been
extensively reviewed by Sandler and Hartley (1995: Chap. 2). In addition to Sandler
(1977) and Murdoch and Sandler (1982) mentioned above, these studies include the
comparison of various types of technologies employed for aggregating the defense
contributions provided by the allies (e.g., Conybeare et al. 1994; see also McGuire
1990: 19); allies’ comparative advantages for supplying public goods (e.g., Boyer
1989); resource allocation processes other than the Nash equilibrium (e.g., McGuire and
Groth 1985); and the effects of domestic decision-making structure (e.g., Murdoch et al.
1991; Jones 1992). More recently, Stone et al. (2008) combined the Olsonian public
goods approach with the repeated prisoner’s dilemma and investigated how
hegemon-led interstate cooperation could provide international institutions.
Among other developments, this study is most closely related to Bruce (1990) and
Ihori (2001) in that, unlike other OZ model variants that focus on the relations within
allies, their models, along with the model in this paper, allow for the relations between
adversarial alliances, although, unlike my model, Bruce (1990) and Ihori (2001) focus
on arms races between adversaries and do not address cooperative security. To the best
of my knowledge, Yamamoto (2010) is the only model that advances Olsonian public
goods analysis by incorporating the role of cooperative security. However, his model
focuses on the effects of the changes of the membership size in alliances. As a result,
unlike this paper, he also fails to analyze the policy effects of states’ implementation of
cooperative security measures on national defense strategy and disarmament in the
world.
Thus, the formation of collective defense arrangements as problems of policy choice
between non-defense activities and different types of defense activities has been
3 The provision of international public goods is also a primary subject addressed by the
theory of hegemonic stability. Although this theory asserts that a hegemon plays a
critical role in the provision of the goods (Kindleberger 1973; Gilpin 1981), Snidal
(1985) argues against these scholars and asserts that the maintenance of international
public goods by a hegemon is only a special case and illustrates the cases in which these
goods can persist even in the absence of that power.
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investigated by the studies inspired by collective action theory (Olson 1971/1965).4
Meanwhile, as described in the previous section, the study of cooperative security has
been led by constructivist perspectives. In this paper, I incorporate the mechanism of
cooperative security into collective action models of defense policy that have been
advanced by the OZ and its variants. In doing so, this paper aims at bridging studies of
collective defense and cooperative security, which have thus far been approached
independently.
3 A TWO-GROUP MODEL
I now consider the world in which countries participating in either alliance A or B
attempt to undertake cooperative security activities between the two groups of states.
Assume that country i is a member of A. 5 i allocates resources, Ii, between a
non-defense private good, ci, and a defense good, qi, where I > 0 and 0, qc .
Moreover, qi is divided into a pure private defense good, pi = iqi, a collective defense
public good, gi = iqi, and a cooperative security public good, yi = iqi, where and
are parameters that satisfy  [0, 1] and .6 i receives positive and
negative defense spillins from its allies and adversaries. There are two types of spillins:
the ones provided by collective defense arrangements, Gi, and the ones provided by
cooperative security measures, Yi. Thus i’s utility function, Ui, depends on ci, qi, Gi, and
Yi. Ui is assumed to be twice-continuously differentiable.
4 Besides collective action theory (or public goods theory), balance of power theory has
played an important role in the study of military alliance (e.g., Waltz 1979: Chap. 6;
Walt 1987; Ikenberry 2002; Paul 2004). More broadly, the study of interstate
cooperation in general has been advanced by a variety of approaches: game theory and
the prisoner’s dilemma (e.g., Axelrod 1984; Oye 1986); international regime theory (e.g.,
Krasner 1983; Young 1989); neoliberal institutionalism (e.g., Keohane 1984); and, more
recently, global governance, albeit with an emphasis on non-state actors (e.g., Hewson
and Sinclair 1999; Weiss 2011).
5 Although I assume that country i is A’s member, the same argument is applicable to
countries in Alliance B because, as described below, the two alliances in the model are
symmetrical.
6 Although the distinction between private and public defense goods is sometimes
unclear, the deployment of conventional forces usually provides greater country-specific
private benefits, whereas weapons such as nuclear missiles play a more public role
among allies (Sandler and Hartley 1995: 31). Meanwhile, cooperative security activities,
such as joint military exercises, disaster relief, peacekeeping operations,
counter-terrorism cooperation, strategic dialogue, military liaison arrangements, and
arms control negotiations between adversarial collective defense organizations (see also
Dunn 2009: 178), yield public benefits that encompass potential enemies.
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Since collective defense arrangements are designed to defend their members from
external aggression (Cohen and Mihalka 2001: 6) by obliging the member states to
abide by the principles of reciprocity and mutual defense (Emmers 2004: 4), the allies’
defense efforts have positive externalities on other member states, while the same
efforts cause negative externalities on non-members (potential enemies). Hence, country
i’s spillins provided by the collective defense arrangements of the allies and adversaries
are written as 


Bk
k
ijAj
ji ggG
,
.7 Meanwhile, cooperative security measures seek
security by supporting ‘the notion that security should be promoted “with others” as
opposed to “against others”’ (Emmers 2004: 3). Hence, spillins produced by cooperative
security activities benefit not only the allies but also the adversaries. The spillins that
country i can receive from cooperative security efforts are written as



Bk
k
ijAj
ji yyY
,
.
Also consider that i’s utility normally increases with an increase in ci and qi (i.e.,
0 ii cU and 0 ii qU ), whereas the replacement of a defense good, qi, by a
non-defense good, ci, decreases i’s utility (i.e., 0 ii cU ) if the adversarial alliance
is seriously threatening i and exposes i to a large amount of negative spillins (i.e.,
0 ii YG and || iii YGq  ).
Based on the above formulation of resource allocation, spillins, and utility, i’s utility
function can be specified as a Cobb-Douglas form, Ui(ci, qi, Gi, Yi,) = ci(pi + gi + Gi + yi
+ Yi). Then, i will allocate resources in order to solve
)(max
,
iiiiiiiii
qc
YqGqqc
ii
 
s.t. Ii = ci + qi. (1)
Proposition 1: Country i spends iq* if
iii IYG  || . iq* is decreasing in cooperative
security activities,  of any other nation, )(, ihBAh  :
22
,,
*





 Bk
k
ijAj
j
Bk
k
ijAj
ji
iii
i
yyggI
YGIq , (2)
7 I use the simplest and most standard summation technology in this model. For other
technologies, see Conybeare et al. (1994) and McGuire (1990).
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
, ( 0 ). (3)
Condition iii IYG  || has two implications. First, since this inequality indicates that
a country’s budget is greater than the absolute size of externalities provided by other
nations, the big countries, rather than the small ones, are more likely to satisfy the
condition. As a result, larger countries would be likely to be more willing to curtail their
defense expenditures by the increase of cooperative security activities by other nations.
Second, since Gi is the summation of both positive and negative spillins brought by the
allies and adversaries, Gi approaches zero as the power of the two alliances is more
balanced. Therefore, if no cooperative security measures are launched (i.e., Yi = 0) and
the power of the international system is balanced, small as well as large countries would
be more likely to meet the condition and thereby choose iq* . Thus, the new initiatives in
cooperative security might be more effective for promoting global disarmament in the
balanced international systems than in the ones characterized by the asymmetry of
power, such as a unipolar system. This analysis suggests that the invention of
cooperative security measures through the creation of the CSCE was a wise policy in
the 1970s, when power was more balanced and the Cold War rivalry was stabilized
between the two blocs.
Proposition 2: Country i spends iq* = 0 if G
i + Yi > Ii. iq* is unchanged with an
increase in cooperative security activities of any other nation.
Considering that cooperative security activities remain nascent in the contemporary
world (i.e., the value of Yi is small), Gi + Yi > Ii indicates that i is strongly protected by
its allies. Although whether this inequality applies to a country depends on the actual
size of the country and the international security environment surrounding it, small
countries, which usually have a small value of Ii, that rely on public defense benefits
provided by other countries are more likely to meet the condition. Member states in
NATO such as Iceland are examples. Moreover, countries in this group are insensitive to
changes in the level of cooperative security activities provided by other nations, and
continue to be free riders irrespective of the changes.
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Proposition 3: Country i spends iq* = I
i if iii IYG  . iq* is unchanged with an
increase in cooperative security activities of any other nation.
By contrast, iii IYG  indicates that i is seriously threatened by its adversaries (or
potential enemies). As a result, i chooses to expand its defense budget. This situation
can be illustrated by isolated states that align themselves with few countries. For
example, countries such as North Korea usually consider themselves to be threatened by
other countries and commit tremendous amounts of their budget to military forces (q) at
the expense of domestic welfare (c). These countries are also indifferent to the
cooperative security activities of other states and continue to spend on defense
regardless of the advancement of cooperative security activities around the world.
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
As the above propositions suggest, the response of countries (that is, the Nash
reaction) depends on their size and the security relationship with other nations. These
results indicate that the effects of cooperative security policy in the contemporary
international system are determined by referring to specific security situations such as
the network of military alliances, the membership of cooperative security organizations,
and national budgets of countries. Addressing this empirical question should be the next
step for research along this study’s lines
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